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Relations between Lawyer and Client




Damages is the powerful yet balanced story of a medical malpractice lawsuit
brought by Donna and Tony Sabia against Dr. Maryellen Humes and Norwalk
Hospital following the birth of their brain-damaged son, Little Tony, on April 1,
1984.1 The Sabias were represented by Koskoff, Koskoff, and Bieder, one of
Connecticut's top personal injury firms. Their case was filed on March 2, 1987,
by Michael Koskoff, considered perhaps the best "medmal" lawyer in the state.2
Ultimately, Humes settled for $1.35 million in February 1992, 3 while Norwalk
Hospital settled for $6.25 million more than six and a half years after the case was
filed.
Not only does Damages provide a detailed account of the litigation process in
a complex medical malpractice action, but it also offers readers a compelling look
at the human toll such a hotly contested case exacts on the plaintiffs, medical pro-
fessionals, and lawyers involved. In addition, the book recounts numerous law-
yer-client interactions and frankly describes how the clients and lawyers felt about
each other. Consequently, Damages vividly demonstrates how such protracted,
emotional litigation is affected by, and ultimately affects, the relationship between
lawyer and client.5 Indeed, it is the book's focus on lawyer-client relations that
makes Damages a superb vehicle for exploring the question of whether the estab-
lishment of a good lawyer-client relationship is, in fact, critical to good lawyering.
This essay begins, therefore, by briefly examining the question of what con-
stitutes good lawyering. The essay acknowledges the difficulty of defining pre-
cisely what is good lawyering. In fact, scholars, judges, and lawyers often dis-
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don School of Economics, 1973; J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1976. 1 would like to thank Ron
McLean for his comments on an earlier draft. I would also like to thank Julia Lu and Jen Melenbrink
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1. BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES: ONE FAMILY'S LEGAL STRUGGLES IN THE WORLD OF MEDICINE
(1998). Throughout the book, the Sabias' son is referred to as Little Tony and his father as Tony.
Little Tony's twin, Michael, was stillborn minutes before Little Tony's birth. For tactical reasons, the
Sabias' lawyers decided not to pursue any cause of action on behalf of Michael. Id. at 64.
2. Id. at 41.
3. Id. at 211.
4. Id. at 365-66.
5. This is true even though the clients-the Sabias, Dr. Maryellen Humes, and Norwalk Hospital-
and their respective lawyers-the members of the Koskoff firm, Bob Monstream, April Haskell, Pat
Ryan, Beverly Hunt, and William Doyle-were dramatically different.
HeinOnline  -- 2004 J. Disp. Resol. 145 2004
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
agree markedly when they characterize lawyer behavior using the term.6 Not
surprising, then, even though academic commentators routinely trumpet the im-
portance of establishing a meaningful attorney-client relationship as an important
aspect of good lawyering,7 not all in the legal profession embrace that view.8
Indeed, the debate about the importance of a good lawyer-client relationship
largely reflects contrasting attitudes within the legal profession about the client's
role in the lawyer-client decision-making process. After briefly discussing the
differing orientations toward lawyer-client decision-making, the essay next looks
at some of the lawyer-client relationships and a number of the lawyer-client inter-
actions depicted in the book to analyze the extent to which the lawyers portrayed
in Damages engaged in good lawyering. The essay concludes by highlighting
some of the lessons about lawyering revealed by examining the lawyer-client
relationships described in the book.
I. WHAT Is GOOD LAWYERING?
In many respects, good lawyering is a concept that defies definition. Unques-
tionably, the evaluation of some aspect of a lawyer's work-of a closing argu-
ment, for example-will necessarily be subjective. Just as judgments about the
quality of a movie, of a piano recital, of a particular dive, or of a gymnast's rou-
tine reflect the biases and values of the person making the judgment, evaluations
of a lawyer's performance will be similarly affected. Nonetheless, even if they
6. Scholars have written volumes about what is demanded of the "good lawyer" and have disagreed
sharply as to the proper role of the good lawyer in the American legal system. Much of the debate
centers on different critiques of the traditional view of the lawyer as a zealous advocate, who does
whatever she can, within the bounds of the law, to promote her clients' interests. See Sharon
Dolovich, Ethical Lawyering and the Possibility of Integrity, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629 (2002). For a
recent series of articles continuing that debate, see Colloquium, What Does It Mean to Practice Law
"In the Interests of Justice" in the Twenty-First Century?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1543-1956 (2002).
Similarly, there is widespread, significant disagreement within the legal profession and the academic
community about the concept of professionalism. See Peter A. Joy, What We Talk about When We
Talk about Professionalism: A Review of Lawyers 'Ideals/Lawyers' Practice: Transformations in the
American Legal Profession, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 987 (1994). This essay is not going to join in
either debate. Rather, this essay assumes that while good lawyering must be ethically principled, it is
not dependant on the adoption of a particular ethical philosophy. See infra notes 17-23 and accompa-
nying text.
7. See ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND
NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 66-75, 109-30 (1990); ROBERT F. COCHRAN,
JR. ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: COLLBORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING 57-60, 113-18 (1999); Robert Bastress, Client-Centered Counseling and Moral Account-
ability for Lawyers, 10 J. LEGAL PROF. 97, 99-103 (1985); Gary Goodpaster, The Human Art of
Lawyering: Interviewing and Counseling, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5, 8 (1975).
8. See, e.g., Marcus T. Boccaccini et al., Client-Relations Skills in Effective Lawyering: Attitudes
of Criminal Defense Attorneys and Experienced Clients, 26 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 97 (2002) (report-
ing empirical study showing that practicing lawyers underestimate the importance of good lawyer-
client relations); Roy B. Flemming, Client Games: Defense Attorney Perspectives on Their Relations
with Criminal Clients, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 253, 261-63 (stating that defense lawyers did not
spend time developing a good relationship with their clients because they did not have the time and
questioned whether spending the time would affect case outcomes). Indeed, Joseph Allegretti suggests
that lawyers "often harbor strongly negative feelings about their clients." Joseph Allegretti, Shooting
Elephants, Serving Clients: An Essay on George Orwell and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 27
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 7 (1993). This resentment of clients leads to relationships marked by manipu-
lation and dominance and not the participatory model touted by academic commentators. Id. at 19-23.
[Vol. I
HeinOnline  -- 2004 J. Disp. Resol. 146 2004
Relations between Lawyer and Client in Damages
cannot define it with any precision, most lawyers and judges know good or bad
lawyering when they see it.9 Although those same judges and lawyers might dis-
agree on the relative merits of some lawyering, there will often be widespread
consensus that a particular argument was brilliant while another was pathetic.
Good lawyering, therefore, involves counsel's skillful, ethical application of
his or her legal training in an effort to help solve a client's legal problem. It is not
enough that a lawyer perform a particular task competently. To qualify as good
lawyering, a lawyer's work must be more than workmanlike, and substantially
better than average. Unquestionably, good lawyering requires a high level of
competence.
Good lawyering, however, is not defined by the result obtained for the client.
A lawyer may give a closing argument that all would agree was marvelous, yet
still lose the case. Indeed, an excellent lawyer may prepare a case flawlessly and
perform brilliantly throughout a trial and still not achieve a good result for the
client. The facts of the case or circumstances beyond counsel's control-the
death of a key witness, for example-will often trump good lawyering. Although
good lawyering improves the client's chances for success in a case, it surely does
not guarantee a successful result.'0
A good lawyer generally strives to give a client a range of creative options to
deal with his or her legal problem. Frequently, good lawyering involves fashion-
ing a solution that eliminates or minimizes the client's problem. If litigation is
involved, a good lawyer usually works to obtain the best settlement or verdict
possible for the client.
Nevertheless, good lawyering cannot ensure that a client's legal problem will,
in fact, be resolved to the client's satisfaction. Counsel may work skillfully to
generate a host of creative solutions to a client's problem yet find that the client's
deteriorating financial situation leaves her unable to take advantage of any of
counsel's alternatives. Similarly, despite the lawyer's excellent trial performance,
the jury might return a verdict much smaller than anticipated. Even though the
client may be very dissatisfied with the result and in turn, with the lawyer's work,
that work still might exemplify good lawyering.
Not surprisingly, lawyers considered to be good lawyers by their peers gener-
ally engage in good lawyering. Nonetheless, they will not always do so. Lawyers
at times simply do not perform commensurate with their general reputation. If an
excellent lawyer comes into a negotiation session underprepared and settles the
case for much less than she could have gotten with her usual proper preparation,
9. As Gary Bellow observed, "there are not articulated (or enforced) criteria defining competent
legal work (beyond recognition of really good or bad work when one sees it)." Gary Bellow, Turning
Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 34 NAT'L LEGAL AID DEFENDERS Ass'N
BRIEFCASE 106, 118 (1977), available at http://www.garybellow.org/garywords/solutions.html (last
visited Apr. 12, 2004). The difficulty in crafting a precise definition of good lawyering is similar to
the problem Justice Potter Stewart faced in attempting to define pornography. As Stewart noted, "I
shall not today attempt to further define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within that
shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I
see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964).
10. In my experience, I have seen inexperienced, barely competent young lawyers, despite their poor
performance, win cases against very good experienced lawyers simply because of the factual strength
of their case.
2004]
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then her work ought not be characterized as good lawyering. Although her per-
formance may have been competent enough to avoid labeling it bad lawyering,
her work in that negotiation was not sufficiently skillful such that it merits being
called good lawyering. 1
On the other hand, a lawyer with a poor reputation may occasionally engage
in good lawyering. Such a lawyer might, for example, follow up on a lead and,
through her imaginative investigation, locate a key witness who enables her to get
a criminal case dismissed. Despite her success, counsel's overall performance
may still have been flawed. For example, she may have failed to file an obvious
suppression motion or failed to even recognize that she might have been able to
obtain the return of her client's property which was unlawfully seized. Nonethe-
less, her investigative work may well qualify as good law) ering.
Similarly, a young lawyer with no reputation in the legal community, and
with few legal skills, may still be capable of good lawyering. Counsel may craft
an excellent motion for summary judgment that eloquently presents her client's
position. The court and opposing counsel might readily acknowledge her motion
and brief as examples of good lawyering. This would be true even though the
judge might deny the motion and even if the client later fires the lawyer errone-
ously believing that counsel's inexperience was to blame for the court's ruling.
This example underscores the reasons why my definition of good lawyering
does not take into consideration client satisfaction. First, clients do not always get
what they think they deserve. As a result, they may unfairly blame their lawyers
and unjustifiably criticize their work even though their lawyers have performed
admirably. Take, for example, a client with a minor back injury with a wholly
unrealistic expectation of the amount of money he is likely to recover. That client
will likely be frustrated by the settlement process and even more aggravated when
the jury returns with what the client deems a paltry amount. Such a client may
well blame his lawyer for his plight despite counsel's good lawyering, including
her valiant efforts to educate the client about the true value of his claim.t 2 In such
a case, the client's dissatisfaction with his lawyer matters little in assessing the
quality of lawyering counsel provided.
Second, clients do not always know what they need, but they may be very sat-
isfied with what they got. A client may come to a lawyer seeking a simple will
and be very satisfied with the will drafted, especially when counsel charges only a
small fee. Yet, if a competent lawyer had reviewed the client's estate she would
have recognized the inadequacy of a simple will and the need for more extensive
estate planning. Thus, even though the client may have been quite satisfied with
counsel and her work product, her lawyer in drafting this simple will may actually
have provided terrible representation.
11. This is so even though the amount obtained may have been higher than some others might have
received, as long as it was less than what other properly prepared, skilled lawyers would have obtained
under the same circumstances.
12. It may be that counsel failed to spend sufficient time with her client talking about the value of
the claim or contributed to the client's unrealistic views by making outlandish statements early in the
case about how much the client was likely to recover. If so, then counsel's bad lawyering may, in fact,
be to blame, at least in part, for the client's dissatisfaction. See, e.g., Boccaccini et al., supra note 8
(discussing a series of studies showing relationship between client dissatisfaction and poor lawyering).
[Vol. I
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Perhaps surprisingly, incompetent or bad lawyers do at times obtain large ver-
dicts or achieve major successes for their clients. Indeed, this may occur in spite
of counsel's mediocre, or even very poor, work. 13 Although the clients may be
thrilled with their lawyers, neither their satisfaction nor the size of the verdict
obtained is an accurate measure of the quality of counsel's performance.
Similarly, it is not enough that counsel quickly solves what the client per-
ceives to be his legal problem. Many clients may misdiagnose their own problem
or fail to appreciate the scope or the nuances of their situation. 14 Moreover, the
client's goals may be based on a faulty understanding of his rights, an ill-defined
notion of his best interests, a limited appreciation of the nature of his problem, or
a blatant disregard for the rights of others. Consequently, helping the client
achieve his stated goals does not necessarily represent good lawyering.' 5 Good
lawyering, however, generally does involve counseling a client so that he has a
better appreciation for his legal predicament and a well-informed understanding of
his legal alternatives.'
6
Finally, client satisfaction cannot be determinative of good lawyering because
a client may at times expect counsel to behave unethically to achieve a favorable
outcome. Unquestionably, lawyers cannot provide assistance that is illegal or
inconsistent with ethical rules. 17 Yet if counsel is unwilling to do what the client
demands, then the client might be very unhappy-even if counsel is doing so be-
13. A terrible golfer might hit a wildly errant shot that bounces off a tree and then rolls a consider-
able distance on a golf cart path landing close to the green. Even though the result may be spectacular,
it was the product of good fortune, not of the bad golfer's ability to make a good shot.
14. See Robert Dinerstein et al., Legal Interviewing and Counseling: An Introduction, 10 CLINICAL
L. REV. 281, 291-92 (2003); Robert S. Redmount, The Nature of Client Counseling and the Code of
Professional Conduct, 47 SASK. L. REV. 186, 188-90 (1982-83).
15. See Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 866 (1987); William H.
Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213 (1991) [herein-
after Simon, Lawyer Advice]. As already noted, scholars disagree vehemently as to whether and under
what circumstances lawyers should compromise client goals in order to serve other societal interests.
Compare Monroe H. Freedman, How Lawyers Act in the Interest of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV.
1717 (2002), and Nancy J. Moore, In the Interests ofJustice: Balancing Client Loyalty and the Public
Good in the Twenty-First Century, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1775 (2002), and Stephen L. Pepper, The
Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 613, and Ted Schneyer, Reforming Law Practice in the Pursuit of Justice: The Perils of Privi-
leging "Public" over Professional Values, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831 (2002), with DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988), and DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF
JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000), and WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF
JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS (1998) [hereinafter SIMON, PRACTICE], and Roger C. Cram-
ton, Furthering Justice by Improving the Adversary System and Making Lawyers More Accountable,
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599 (2002).
16. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERING § 20 cmt. c. (2000). Similarly, a
good lawyer discusses the client's goals regardless of whether counsel sees herself as a zealous advo-
cate or if she believes she is morally obligated to discuss the broader implications of the client's pre-
ferred goals. See Dolovich, supra note 6, at 1643.
17. "A lawyer's first professional obligation is to obey the rules of professional ethics of the jurisdic-
tion in which the lawyer is licensed to practice." ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT 585 (4th ed. 1999). See also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002) ("A
lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent ...."); Id. at R. 8.4(a) (stating that it is professional misconduct to violate or
attempt to violate the Rules); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1980) (stat-
ing a lawyer shall not "counsel or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent").
2004]
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cause of legitimate ethical concerns. Despite the client dissatisfaction it causes, a
lawyer generally ought not to be subject to criticism for adhering to the ethical
rules of the profession.'
8
It is almost inconceivable that a lawyer could violate a clear ethical norm and
be deemed to have engaged in good lawyering. Thus, any definition of good
lawyering must require that counsel behave in accordance with ethical norms.
Admittedly, however, counsel committed to zealously representing her client may
find herself having to take action that skirts the line between ethical and unethical
conduct. Ethical line drawing can be a perplexing challenge. Indeed, in some
instances, scholars vigorously disagree as to where that ethical line should be
drawn. 19 The lawyer who finds herself in a vexing ethical dilemma that demands
that she take some action, therefore, is likely to be condemned by some and
praised by others regardless of how she resolves the dilemma.2 ° What is critical,
however, is that the lawyer has made a conscientious, principled decision to re-
spond to that dilemma and behaved accordingly.
2 1
Nonetheless, in some instances, a lawyer who acts zealously on behalf of a
client's interests will be in clear contravention of established ethical norms.22 At
other times, counsel may act on behalf of her client without ever recognizing or
18. This assumes, of course, that the lawyer is not misapplying or misinterpreting the ethical rules.
It may be very bad lawyering for counsel to take certain action or decline to take some action because
she erroneously believes such behavior is mandated by the ethical rules. In addition, some scholars do
criticize lawyers, even when they adhere to current ethical rules, for promoting their client's interests
at the expense of justice or morality. See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 15 (arguing that lawyers individu-
ally and collectively need to assume greater responsibility for the consequences of their actions);
Cramton, supra note 15 (criticizing lawyers for following the prevailing ethic of zealous advocacy and
urging reforms that modify lawyer hyper-adversarialism). But see Schneyer, supra note 15 (taking
issue with aspects of Professor Rhode's critique and challenging her "contextual" view of legal ethics).
19. For example, Monroe Freedman and Harry Subin disagree vigorously whether it should be
proper for a criminal defense lawyer to seek to discredit a truthful witness through cross-examination.
Compare MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 161-71 (1990) (stating that
counsel is required to discredit the truthful witness unless doing so hurts the client's case), with Harry
1. Subin, Is This Lie Necessary? Further Reflections on the Right to Present a False Defense, I GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 689 (1988) (arguing that defense counsel ought not to be permitted to deceive the jury
by knowingly discrediting the truthful witness and that constraining counsel's advocacy will enhance,
not undermine, the ends of the criminal justice system).
20. The criminal defense lawyers in People v. Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1975), aff'd
376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff'd 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y. 1976) were widely denounced
and even criminally prosecuted for failing to disclose the location of several bodies buried by their
client. Although the intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the indictment,
that court noted that the attorney-client privilege is not "all-encompassing" and suggested that the
client's interests had to be balanced with "standards of decency" and "the interests of society and its
individual members." Beige, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 772. Nevertheless, the New York state bar ethics com-
mittee ultimately concluded that the lawyers behaved properly and that disclosure would have violated
DR 4-101(B). N.Y. St. Bar Ethics Op. 479 (1978). Most commentators share that view. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWERING § 60 cmt. b; I GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.
& W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 9.20 Illustration 9-4 (3d ed. 2003).
21. In other words, as I am using the term, it does not matter if a lawyer sides with Freedman or
Subin on the issue of discrediting the truthful witness. As long as a lawyer is acting consistent with an
ethically principled position, her skillful application of her legal ability on behalf of her client may be
characterized as "good lawyering."
22. See, e.g., Lipin v. Bender, 620 N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. 1994) (involving a lawyer whose client
surreptitiously took opposing counsel's work product document off counsel's table, gave it to counsel
who, after reading the privileged material, attempted to take advantage of the improperly gained in-
formation).
[Vol. I
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considering the obvious ethical implications of her conduct.23 In either situation,
such conduct ought not to be considered good lawyering even though it produces
a good result for the client or is enthusiastically applauded by the client. Simply
put, good lawyering must be ethically-sound lawyering.
To be an ethically-sound lawyer, counsel must be able to recognize ethical di-
lemmas, to analyze them properly, and then make good judgments. A lawyer's
life is filled with countless situations in which counsel must make judgment calls.
Some decisions are made quickly with minimal reflection and without client input.
Counsel decides, for example, not to return opposing counsel's phone call about a
potential settlement immediately, but rather opts to wait until the next day. Other
decisions-whether to include a specific argument in an appellate brief-may or
may not be made in consultation with her client.
24
Not surprisingly, good decision-making is a hallmark of good lawyering. As
many commentators have recognized, a good lawyer not only makes wise judg-
ment calls herself, but she also skillfully counsels her clients to make good deci-
sions.25 Although all would agree that good lawyering is the product of wise
judgment, lawyers often disagree sharply over whose judgment-the lawyer's or
client's-should control in a particular situation.26  This disagreement reflects
23. For example, in United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1981), defense counsel substi-
tuted someone else at counsel's table with intent to cause the government's witness to incorrectly
identify the person at counsel's table as the defendant. Id. at 1336. The witness did so. Id. Defense
counsel revealed the misidentification at the close of the government's case. Id. at 1336-37. The trial
judge allowed the government to reopen its case and subsequently found counsel in contempt for using
this tactic. Id. at 1337. Defense counsel claimed it was a good faith tactic used to test the govern-
ment's witness and was not prohibited by any court rule. Id. at 1338. The court agreed that counsel
must represent his client zealously, however, his failure to recognize that his conduct went beyond
reasonable limits of advocacy justified his contempt conviction. Id.
24. Compare Chief Justice Burger's view of lawyering emphasizing lawyer control of strategic
decision-making even without consultation with the defendant in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
93-94 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) and Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 750-54 (1983) with that of
Justice Brennan proposing a more client-centered approach. Jones, 463 U.S. at 758-59 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
25. See, e.g., COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2-9; ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:
FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 128-34 (1993); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The
Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060-89 (1976). For those commen-
tators emphasizing the importance of client autonomy, it is critical to maximize client self-
determination and wise decision-making. See, e.g., Bastress, supra note 7, at 100-03. On the other
hand, there are some scholars who forcefully argue that good lawyers at times are required to be pater-
nalistic. See David Luban, Paternalism and the Legal Profession, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 454 (198 1). For
a thoughtful look at the difficulty of distinguishing the refined paternalist view and the autonomy view
in practice, see Simon, Lawyer Advice, supra note 15.
26. For a study documenting the different attitudes of criminal defense lawyers on the questions of
whether counsel or the client ultimately should control certain critical decisions, see Rodney J. Uphoff
& Peter B. Wood, The Allocation of Decision-Making between Defense Counsel and Criminal Defen-
dant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client Decision-Making, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 27-60 (1998)
[hereinafter Uphoff & Wood, Allocation]. Model Rule 1.2(a) mandates that, subject to limited excep-
tions, lawyers shall abide by their clients' choices concerning the objectives of representation. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2. On the other hand, although counsel should consult with
the client as to the means, it generally is the lawyer's responsibility to select the means used to achieve
the client's ends. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. As the comment to Rule 1.2
acknowledges, however, a clear distinction between objectives and means sometimes cannot be drawn.
Id. For a discussion of the limited guidance provided lawyers seeking to resolve the issue of the allo-
cation of decision-making responsibility by ethical rules and case law, see Rodney J. Uphoff, Who
2004]
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very conflicting views about the appropriate role of counsel in representing a cli-
ent and in markedly different orientations toward lawyer-client decision-making.
Invariably, a lawyer's-or a scholar's-view of what constitutes good lawyering
is shaped by her decision-making orientation.
IIl. MODELS OF LAWYERING
In their text, The Counselor-at-Law: A Collaborative Approach To Client In-
terviewing and Counseling, Robert Cochran, John D. Pippa, and Martha Peters
identified three models of lawyering: the authoritarian model, the client-centered
counseling model, and the collaborative decision-making model.27 Although other
commentators have used slightly different terms over the years to describe differ-
ent models of lawyering, 28 the models described by Cochran and his fellow au-
thors are widely recognized. Each model or approach to lawyering reflects a dif-
ferent orientation toward the allocation of lawyer-client decision-making power.
In discussing the authoritarian model-also commonly referred to as the tra-
ditional model 9 -Cochran and his colleagues drew heavily on the work of Doug-
las Rosenthal. In his often cited empirical study of personal injury lawyers and
their clients, Rosenthal found that a majority of lawyers are authoritarian in orien-
tation.30 The authoritarian or traditional view emphasizes lawyer control over the
decision-making process. Counsel is responsible for case decisions while the
client passively relies on the lawyer's judgment. As Cochran and his fellow au-
thors observed, the authoritarian model assumes that lawyers render effective
service; that they make disinterested, objective decisions; that solutions to legal
problems are largely technical and generally have a correct solution; and that law-
yers as experts have the technical ability needed to determine the correct solu-
tion.3'
The second model identified by Cochran and his colleagues is the client-
centered model. David Binder and Susan Price first presented this model in their
classic work, Legal Interviewing and Counseling.32 The client-centered approach
Should Control the Decision to Call a Witness: Respecting a Criminal Defendant's Tactical Choices,
68 U. CINN. L. REV. 763, 772-98 (2000) [hereinafter Uphoff, Tactical Choices].
27. COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2.
28. See, e.g., ROGER S. HAYDOCK ET AL., LAWYERING: PRACTICE AND PLANNING 17-20 (1996)
(categorizing lawyers along a spectrum with the lawyer as technician on one end, the lawyer as wise
counselor at the other, and the lawyer as creator or problem-solver in the middle); JAMES E.
MOLITERNO, ETHICS OF THE LAWYER'S WORK 129-33 (2d ed. 2003) (referring to the Hired Gun
Model, the Expert Model, and the Collaborative Model); John Basten, Control and the Lawyer-Client
Relationship, 6 J. LEGAL PROF. 7, 16 (1981) (identifying the traditional lawyer-control model, the
client-control model, and the co-operative model).
29. The traditional, authoritarian approach maximizes lawyer autonomy by giving counsel broad
authority to make the strategic decisions needed to attain the results consistent with the lawyer's view
of the client's best interests. For a more extended look at this approach to lawyering, see THOMAS L.
SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 5-14, 30-39
(1994); Vivian D. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead
End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 33-37 (1986); Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decision-Making:
Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41 (1979).
30. DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974).
31. COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2.
32. See DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-
CENTERED APPROACH (1977). Joined by their colleague, Paul Bergman, Binder and Price authored a
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seeks to promote client autonomy by making the client an active participant in the
decision-making process. 33 The lawyer tries to identify the client's problem from
the client's perspective and then enlists the client's aid in identifying potential
solutions and the likely consequences of each solution. Ultimately, counsel en-
courages the client to make all decisions that are likely to have a substantial legal
or non-legal impact on the client's case. 34 The client-centered model emphasizes
client feelings, stresses the importance of lawyer empathy, and insists that lawyers
accept client values when rendering advice. Lawyers' recommendations, there-
fore, shall be designed to promote the client's best interests as defined by that
client. 35 As Cochran and his compatriots pointed out, "whereas the client has a
very limited role in the authoritarian model, the lawyer has a very limited role in
the client-centered model.
3 6
The third model discussed by Cochran and his fellow authors is the collabora-
tive decision-making model. Once again, they looked to Douglas Rosenthal who
urged lawyers and clients to engage in "mutual participation in a cooperative rela-
tionship., 37 To Cochran and his colleagues, the collaborative model is superior to
the client-centered model because it increases counsel's flexibility, promotes
equality, and encourages a lawyer-client dialog about the effects that case deci-
sions may have on others.38 Thus, in Cochran's collaborative model, "the client
would control decisions, but the lawyer would structure the process and provide
advice in a manner that is likely to yield wise decisions.
39
Cochran and his colleagues trumpet the collaborative model because they be-
lieve that lawyers following this approach are more likely to achieve what Dean
Anthony Kronman calls practical wisdom.40 To Kronman, the key to being a good
lawyer is the ability to exercise practical wisdom. To exercise such wisdom, a
lawyer must "combine the opposing qualities of sympathy and detachment.
' 41
Acting as a counselor and friend, the good lawyer strives to help her clients make
sound judgments. To render the good advice her client needs, counsel must also
seek to understand the client. Ultimately, "it is only through a process of joint
revised text, DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 5 (1991), which continues to play an influential role in legal education.
33. This is the approach favored by most legal educators. See Linda F. Smith, Interviewing Clients:
A Linguistic Comparison of the "Traditional" Interview and the "Client-Centered" Interview, I
CLINICAL L. REV. 541, 543 (1995) (observing that the client-centered theory of representation is "ac-
cepted and adopted throughout the nation's law schools"). For a sampling of the variations of the
client-centered approach, see Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and
Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV 501 (1990); Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV.
717 (1987); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case Theory,
93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994); Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relation-
ship: The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1987).
34. BINDER ET AL., supra note 32, at 20-21.
35. Id. at 21, 347-59.
36. See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 5. It should be noted, however, that many commentators
espousing a client-centered approach have argued for a greater role for counsel than that originally
advocated by Binder and Price. See Dinerstein, supra note 33, at 507, 510, 567-70; Dinerstein et al.,
supra note 14, at 302-03; Ellmann, supra note 33, at 744-52, 767.
37. ROSENTHAL, supra note 30, at 57.
38. See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 7.
39. Id. at 6.
40. See id. at 7.
41. See KRONMAN, supra note 25, at 304.
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deliberations, in which the lawyer imaginatively assumes his client's position, and
with sympathetic detachment begins to examine the alternatives for himself, that
the necessary understanding can emerge.' 42 Using this process then, the good
lawyer is better able to assist her client in making the "deliberatively wise choice"
among alternatives. 43 Thus, not only does the good lawyer exercise practical wis-
dom, but she helps her client make wise judgments as well.
Many lawyers tend to have a client-centered or authoritarian orientation,
while a few favor a more collaborative approach. 44 Not all lawyers, however, can
be readily identified with a particular style or orientation. s Some lawyers may
vary their approach significantly depending upon the client, the nature of the case,
or the particular decision at issue.46 Thus, lawyers preferring a client-centered
approach may not consistently consult with clients with respect to all significant
case decisions nor uniformly provide all of their clients equal access to decision-
making power. Similarly, a lawyer with a more authoritarian orientation may not
necessarily dictate all strategic decisions to every client who insists upon a ques-
tionable strategic choice. Research suggests, nonetheless, that lawyers do tend to
favor a specific decision-making orientation, and their preferred orientation in-
variably reflects their view of the extent to which counsel should ultimately con-
trol case decision-making. 47  In turn, a lawyer's decision-making orientation is
very likely to affect the manner in which lawyer and client interact and, inevita-
bly, the relationship between them.
42. Id. at 133. Other commentators also have advocated a participatory or collaborative approach to
lawyering. See MOLITERNO, supra note 28, at 129-33; LEONARD R. RISKIN & JAMES E. WES'TBROOK,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 46-49 (abr. 2d ed. 1998); Alex J. Hurder, Negotiating the Law-
yer-Client Relationship: A Search for Equality and Collaboration, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 71 (1996);
Spiegel, supra note 29.
43. KRONMAN, supra note 25, at 129.
44. There have been a limited number of studies looking at the extent to which lawyers actually
involve their clients in decision-making. Certainly, the most significant study was that done by Doug-
las Rosenthal of personal injury lawyers and their interactions with their clients. ROSENTHAL, supra
note 30. Rosenthal's work and the study of public defenders I did with Peter Wood confirm that law-
yers have markedly different orientations toward the allocation of decision-making authority. See
Uphoff & Wood, Allocation, supra note 26. In our study of 699 public defenders, Wood and I found
that sixty-two percent of the lawyers surveyed generally favored a more authoritarian, lawyer-centered
approach, while thirty-eight percent approved of a more client-centered approach. Id. at 32-5 1. For
other field studies demonstrating that lawyers can be found favoring each decision-making orientation,
see KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A PORTRAIT OF ATTORNEYS AT WORK 37-
67 (1985); HUBERT J. O'GORMAN, LAWYERS AND MATRIMONIAL CASES: A STUDY OF INFORMAL
PRESSURES IN PRIVATE PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 163-64 (1963); Gary Neustadter, When Lawyer and
Client Meet: Observations of Interviewing and Counseling Behavior in the Consumer Bankruptcy Law
Office, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 177 (1986); Norman G. Poythress et al., Client Abilities to Assist Counsel and
Make Decisions in Criminal Cases: Findings from These Studies, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 437, 450
(1994); Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Law and Strategy in the Divorce Lawyer's Office, 20 L.
& SOC'Y REV. 93 (1986).
45. Hurder, supra note 42, at 77-80 (arguing that dividing decisions into those that are the client's
with the others for the lawyer is not desirable nor does it reflect actual practice).
46. See Basten, supra note 28, at 16 (stating that lawyers adopt different approaches depending on
nature of their clients, background experiences, and areas of work); Uphoff & Wood, Allocation, supra
note 26, at 38-39 (finding the commitment to a client-centered approach varied significantly depending
on the strategic decision at issue).
47. See Uphoff& Wood, Allocation, supra note 26, at 27-60.
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IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF A GOOD LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
Does good lawyering, then, require that counsel establish a meaningful rela-
tionship with her client? For lawyers and scholars who prefer a client-centered or
collaborative approach, the answer is generally yes.48 The good lawyer will con-
centrate on forging a good relationship with her clients because doing so leads to
more effective communication and the discovery of more relevant facts. This, in
turn, enhances decision-making and, ultimately, improves the chances of success-
fully resolving the case. Moreover, the lawyer using either of these two ap-
proaches is more likely to obtain the optimal result consistent with the client's
best interests because she has taken the time to explore that subject with the client.
To the proponents of the client-centered or collaborative approach, it is not
surprising that a good lawyer-client relationship increases client satisfaction.
Clients want to be treated with respect. Clients generally appreciate lawyers who
care about them and who are attentive to their feelings.4 9 Clients often will re-
spond favorably to lawyers with good relational skills and tend to trust such law-
yers. Clients who trust counsel are, in turn, more likely to be satisfied with their
case outcomes and more likely to believe they were treated fairly by the legal
system.
5 °
The lawyer favoring the authoritarian approach might well scoff at the notion
that most clients really care about anything other than the bottom line. Indeed, for
lawyers with this orientation, the quality of the relationship may be largely irrele-
vant to the lawyer's primary task of resolving the client's problem as best she
can.5' As a trained and skilled advocate, the lawyer is in the best position to as-
certain what clients really need and what course of action to pursue to achieve
those needs.5 2 To the proponents of the authoritarian approach, therefore, it is the
lawyer viewing the client's situation objectively and dispassionately who should
manage the case and make case decisions without interference from emotionally
48. See, e.g., Boccaccini et al., supra note 8, at 97-117 (claiming that a good relationship between
lawyer and client served the interests of both); Dinerstein, supra note 33, at 547-56; Stephen Feldman
& Kent Wilson, The Value of Interpersonal Skills in Lawyering, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 311, 320
(1981) (reporting that clients valued attorney's interpersonal skills over legal skills); Welsh S. White,
Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases. The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L.
REV. 323, 337-40, 374-76 (arguing that building a trusting relationship is a prerequisite to effective
representation).
49. See, e.g., BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 7, at 130; Marcus T. Boccaccini & Stanley L.
Brodsky, Characteristics of the Ideal Criminal Defense Attorney from the Client's Perspective: Em-
pirical Findings and Implicationsfor Legal Practice, 25 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 81, 106 (2001) [here-
inafter Boccaccini & Brodsky, Characteristics].
50. See Boccaccini et al., supra note 8, at 97; Marcus T. Boccaccini & Stanley L. Brodsky, Attorney-
Client Trust among Convicted Criminal Defendants: Preliminary Examination of the Attorney-Client
Trust Scales, 20 BEHAV. SCi. & L. 69 (2002); Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony
Cases, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 483, 498 (1988); Jean M. Landis & Lynne Goodstein, When Is Justice
Fair? An Integrated Approach to the Outcome Versus Procedure Debate, 1987 AM. B. FOuND. RES.
J., at 675, 701 (1987).
51. See Dinerstein, supra note 33, at 506.
52. See Basten, supra note 28, at 17-18. Judicial opinions frequently invoke this argument to justify
giving counsel virtually unchecked power over tactical decisions. See, e.g., Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d
1071, 1073 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (Thornberry, Clark, Roney, Gee, and Hill, J.J., specially concur-
ring) (noting that defense lawyers as "professional artisans" were in the best position to decide trial
strategy).
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distraught or foolish clients and without spending unnecessary time consulting
with their clients.53
Unquestionably, there are some lawyers who, regardless of their attitude to-
ward decision-making, care little about fostering a good relationship with their
clients. For example, some unethical lawyers abuse or manipulate clients for their
own interests with little or no regard for their clients' interests. Needless to say,
such lawyers care little about their relationship with their clients. On the other
hand, the ethical lawyer following the traditional, more authoritarian model may
well believe that she can effectively serve her clients' best interests without pay-
ing any significant attention to the relationship she has with her clients. Much like
the brusque doctor who purports to treat the illness, not the patient, such a lawyer
may see little need to cultivate a good relationship with her clients.54 This is par-
ticularly so if devoting time to the relationship detracts from the time she has to
attend to investigation, case preparation, or other aspects of the case.
55
Nor are all clients necessarily interested in a meaningful relationship with
their lawyers. Certainly, some clients are only interested in the bottom line.56
They want counsel to obtain the best outcome possible and to do so as quickly and
as cheaply as feasible. They are not interested in client autonomy but simply want
their lawyer to take care of the matter as best she can. 57 For such clients, the qual-
ity of the relationship that they have with their lawyer may well be irrelevant.
They have little patience with expensive small talk-especially with a person they
view as a legal technician, not as their friend. Accordingly, such clients not only
lack any interest in a lawyer's efforts to build rapport, but they may even resent
such efforts.
In addition, some clients are not interested in having their lawyers limited to
using only ethical means on their behalf. Rather, these clients encourage or even
53. See Allegretti, supra note 8, at 19; Basten, supra note 28, at 17-18. For an extended discussion
of the mixed guidance provided by ethics rules, professional norms, and case law on the question of
whether counsel or client ultimately controls strategic decisions, see Uphoff, Tactical Choices, supra
note 26, at 772-98.
54. See Boccaccini et al., supra note 8, at 102-17 (reporting that the findings from their study and
other studies showed that lawyers neither sufficiently valued good relations with their clients, nor were
they willing to spend the time to achieve such a relationship). For a look at the increasing importance
that the medical profession places on good relations, see for example, JOHN L. COULEHAN & MARIAN
R. BLOCK, THE MEDICAL INTERVIEW: MASTERING SKILLS FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE 3-37, 251-60 (4th
ed. 2001) (stressing the importance of an empathetic, compassionate approach and good communica-
tion skills in order to build a good doctor-patient relationship); WILLIAM R. MILLER & STEPHEN
ROLLNICK, MOTIVATIONAL INTERVIEWING: PREPARING PEOPLE TO CHANGE ADDICTIVE BEHAVIOR 6-
7 (2d ed. 2002) (touting the importance of an empathetic counseling relationship to patient success in
therapeutic treatment); Linda F. Smith, Medical Paradigms for Counseling: Giving Clients Bad News,
4 CLINICAL L. REV. 391, 393-98 (1998) (describing studies in medical literature suggesting need for
doctors to improve ability to counsel in an empathetic manner instead of a cold, detached manner
disliked by patients) [hereinafter Smith, Medical Paradigms].
55. See Flemming, supra note 8, at 261.
56. But see Jill Schachner Chanen, The Heart of the Matter, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1995, at 78 (noting that
lawyers often mistakenly assume clients are only interested in winning). See also Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 754, 761 (1984) (describing that clients' needs and ends must be ascertained because economic
ends may not be pre-eminent).
57. As William Simon correctly points out, some clients do not want to make hard decisions, but
prefer instead to put their fate in the hands of their lawyer. See Simon, Lawyer Advice, supra note 15,
at 216-18.
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expect counsel to get the best results possible regardless of what steps must be
taken to obtain those results. Undoubtedly, such clients may care little about es-
tablishing a meaningful relationship with counsel.58
Nevertheless, most clients want a good relationship with their lawyer. 59 They
want to be able to confide in and to trust the person that they are counting on to
help them resolve their problem.60  Not only do clients want a lawyer who will
listen and respect them, but a legal counselor who cares about them and under-
stands their situation. 61 In short, most clients value lawyers with good interper-
sonal skills.
6 2
Studies show that lawyers with the ability to relate well with their clients are
consistently viewed by those clients as more competent and more likely to help
clients achieve their goals. 63 Thus, good lawyer-client relations tend to produce
satisfied clients. It would seemingly follow then, that lawyers would pay attention
to developing good interpersonal skills and a good relationship with their clients.
In the end, many lawyers are likely to claim that they value establishing a
good relationship with their clients. But what does it mean to say that a lawyer
and a client have a good relationship? Because clients and lawyers do not all
value the same things, it is hardly surprising that lawyers and commentators dis-
agree about the elements of a good lawyer-client relationship.64 Indeed, what one
lawyer or commentator might describe as a good relationship, another might view
58. On the other hand, some clients-for instance a mob boss-may still value highly having a good
relationship with their ethically compromised but loyal lawyer.
59. See, e.g., Boccaccini et al., supra note 8, at 113-17; Chanen, supra note 56. Similarly, most
patients want a good relationship with a doctor who is an empathetic, caring professional. See Smith,
Medical Paradigms, supra note 54, at 393-98, 409-30.
60. "Nothing is more fundamental to the lawyer-client relationship than the establishment of trust
and confidence." ABA STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-3.1, cmt., at 149 (2d ed. 1980). See
NOELLE C. NELSON, CONNECTING WITH YOUR CLIENT: SUCCESS THROUGH IMPROVED CLIENT
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNIQUES xi (1996) ("Clients are reluctant to cooperate with lawyers who fail to
treat them with the respect they deserve.").
61. See Boccaccini & Brodsky, Characteristics, supra note 49, at 96-101; Alan P. Levine, Looking
for Mr. Goodlawyer: What Clients Want, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1992, at 60-62.
62. See Boccaccini et al., supra note 8, at 113-17; Feldman & Wilson, supra note 48.
63. See, e.g., Feldman & Wilson, supra note 48, at 320. Moreover, Binder, Bergman, and Price
persuasively argue that for most clients "whatever the legal aspects of a problem, non-legal aspects
frequently are at the heart of a client's concerns. Effective counseling inevitably requires that you
elicit information about those non-legal aspects and factor them into a problem's resolution." BINDER
ET AL., supra note 32, at 5.
64. For example, John Donnell's vision of an ideal lawyer-client relationship is characterized as:
The ideal counsel-client relationship is based upon the mutual trust of each party as individuals
and upon respect for each other as a person competent in his own field. It is a relationship in
which neither party seeks to dominate or permits himself to be dominated; yet each is open to in-
fluence from the other. It is a personal, helping relationship that goes beyond providing special-
ized knowledge and offering legal opinions on fact situations defined by the client .... It is a
relationship that can only develop through numerous interactions between counsel and client and,
therefore, it must be cultivated over a period of time.
JOHN D. DONNELL, THE CORPORATE COUNSEL: A ROLE STUDY 173-74 (1970). Compare Donnell's
vision with that of William Simon who presents an alternative lawyer-client relationship, one that he
terms a non-professional relation. William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice
and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIs. L. REV. 29, 32-36 (contrasting the "non-professional relation" with
the helping or accepting lawyer-client relationship which draws from "existentialist psychotherapy")
[hereinafter Simon, Ideology].
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as dysfunctional. 65 Thus, just as with good lawyering, it is easier to identify as-
pects of a good lawyer-client relationship than to craft a precise definition.
For the traditional lawyer with an authoritarian orientation, a good relation-
ship begins with the client trusting that his lawyer will skillfully and zealously
deal with the client's legal problem.66 Given such trust, the client will truthfully
reveal his problem to counsel and then let her pursue the course of action she
deems best without any interference. Certainly, counsel will strive to keep her
client reasonably informed so that the client can make the limited decisions ex-
pected of him. In a good working relationship, however, the client will not place
unnecessary demands on the lawyer's time. A client who insists on lengthy ex-
planations or tries to dictate strategy shows a lack of respect for counsel. To the
authoritarian, such behavior is inconsistent with a healthy lawyer-client relation-
ship.
The lawyer following a client-centered or collaborative approach has a very
different view of a good lawyer-client relationship. Like the traditionalist, she
views a trusting relationship between lawyer and client as essential if she is going
to be able to provide the client effective representation. If the client does not trust
counsel, communication between client and counsel will be impaired.67 To the
traditionalist, once the client has turned over the problem to counsel, the lack of
good communication is not particularly significant. To the client-centered or col-
laborative lawyer, however, without good communication, counsel is unlikely to
understand the client's goals and may fail to learn critical facts needed to enable
counsel to achieve these goals. Thus, counsel strives to foster open communica-
tion with her client because, by doing so, she is more likely to be an effective
interviewer and counselor. Indeed:
[E]ffective legal interviewing and counseling is foundational to effective
performance of almost all other lawyer tasks. A lawyer who does not
have good interviewing and counseling skills will not be a good advo-
cate. A litigator who is a poor interviewer will miss facts that she should
know at trial; a negotiator who is a poor counselor will not know what
settlement terms will best meet his client's needs.68
In addition, the proponents of the client-centered or collaborative approach
agree that a good lawyer-client relationship involves mutual respect and shared
expectations.69 Open communication ensures that lawyer and client are working
65. Similarly, some people disagree sharply as to what constitutes a desirable marital relationship.
Moreover, just as marital relationships evolve over time, there are different kinds and stages of a law-
yer-client relationship. Dinerstein, supra note 33, at 547.
66. Id. at 506. In describing his relationship with his clients, Chesterfield Smith, former ABA Presi-
dent, noted "[C]lients before long get great confidence in me and they don't want me to tell them all of
the alternatives. They want me to tell them what to do. I do it and charge them." Panel Discussion, A
Gathering of Legal Scholars to Discuss "Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, "35 MIAMI L. REV. 639, 643 (1981).
67. See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 58; HAYDOCK ET AL., supra note 28, at 46-54.
68. COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 2.
69. See id at 25, 35-36, 57-58; Bastress, supra note 7, at 99-100. Although frequently critical of the
client-centered approach, William Simon also proclaims the importance of mutual respect and ac-
knowledges that "some sharing of ends will be necessary, but this sharing need not approach a com-
plete coincidence of ends." Simon, Ideology, supra note 64, at 33.
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together to obtain the clients' ends. Unlike the traditionalist, these lawyers value
client participation despite the added time that a lawyer must spend to make that
participation meaningful. 70  The client-centered lawyer seeks to promote client
autonomy.7' It is, after all, the client's case.
Finally, the collaborative lawyer views good communication as critical be-
cause counsel and client share decision-making responsibility.72 That does not
mean, of course, that client-centered or collaborative lawyers will not have dis-
agreements with their clients over the direction of the case. They surely will.
Nonetheless, these lawyers will resolve conflicts with their clients through discus-
sion, and not by the sheer will of counsel.
V. LOOKING AT THE LAWYERING IN DAMAGES
It would be reasonable to expect that Damages would showcase good lawyer-
ing because this book is about a multi-million dollar settlement involving some of
Connecticut's top trial lawyers. Undoubtedly, the members of the Koskoff firm,
Connecticut's premier law firm representing plaintiffs in medical malpractice
cases, were widely regarded as excellent lawyers. Similarly, because of the poten-
tial for a huge verdict, the defendants in the Sabia case hired some of the state's
leading insurance defense lawyers-Bill Doyle, Pat Ryan, and Arnold Bai among
others. Given the outstanding reputations of most of the lawyers involved in the
case, it also would be reasonable to expect that these lawyers would be superb
interviewers and counselors, combining both high levels of legal competence and
excellent interpersonal skills. Finally, given the quality of the lawyers involved, it
would be reasonable to expect that Damages would feature good lawyer-client
relationships built on trust. Unfortunately, neither the lawyers, the lawyering, nor
the relationships described in the book generally measure up to those expecta-
tions.73
70. See Dinerstein, supra note 33, at 552-54. Indeed, David Chavkin insists that "most clinicians
believe that one cannot be a skillful lawyer without embracing the value of client-centeredness. The
achievement of one or more client goals as an outcome and maximization of the role of the client in the
decision-making process are touchstones against which we evaluate responsible and effective lawyer."
David F. Chavkin, Spinning Straw into Gold: Exploring the Legacy of Bellow and Moulton, 10
CLINICAL L. REV. 245, 254 (2003).
71. See Bastress, supra note 7, at 100; Dinerstein, supra note 33, at 507, 512-17. But see William H.
Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1998) (criticizing the emphasis that
others place on client autonomy) [hereinafter Simon, Ethical Discretion].
72. Basten, supra note 28, at 23-24.
73. Admittedly, my critique of the lawyers and the lawyering in Damages is based on Werth's
accounts of the lawyers' behavior and his version of their explanations for their actions. Although
Werth is a very accomplished jouralist, he may not have fully captured all of the relevant context
surrounding some of the events described in Damages or related some significant nuance that would
clarify why a lawyer acted in a particular instance. I recognize, therefore, that the lawyers in the book
may be able to present additional information that would cast them, their conduct, or their relationship
with their clients in a much different light. Finally, busy lawyers trying to do their best for a number of
clients do not always perform flawlessly. Nor, for that matter, do law professors.
2004]
HeinOnline  -- 2004 J. Disp. Resol. 159 2004
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Lawyer-Client Communication
From the traditionalist perspective, Damages does, for the most part, high-
light good lawyers skillfully plying their craft. On the other hand, for those who
view lawyering through a client-centered or collaborative lens, Damages abounds
with examples of poor communication between lawyer and client. In light of their
stellar reputations, the lawyers featured in Damages, did not display the relational
skills one would expect. Perhaps surprisingly, some of the lawyer-client relation-
ships described were actually dysfunctional-only a few relationships appeared
healthy. In fact, few of the lawyers portrayed in Damages seemed committed to
establishing a good relationship with their client. In short, using the criteria dis-
cussed by the proponents of client-centered or collaborative lawyering, Damages
offers far more instances of poor lawyering than examples of good lawyering.
Good attorney-client relationships rarely just happen. As studies and client
surveys demonstrate, the development of a trusting, meaningful attorney-client
relationship often requires a lawyer to devote considerable time and attention to
the relationship.74 Yet, not every lawyer will be willing to invest the requisite
time to establish or to maintain a quality attorney-client relationship. Addition-
ally, not every lawyer appreciates what he or she must do to forge a quality rela-
tionship. Finally, some cases-especially those where there is little at stake or
those which will last only a short time-may not warrant the costs involved in
forming a good lawyer-client relationship.
Because of the enormous stakes involved and the length of time it generally
takes to resolve a medical malpractice action, it would be surprising if the mem-
bers of the Koskoff firm were not very interested in establishing a good attorney-
client relationship with the Sabias. Damages leaves readers questioning, however,
whether Michael Koskoff was, in fact, committed to establishing such a relation-
ship. Werth traces Koskoff's rise from a radical lawyer "with a heightened sense
of justice" for the socially and economically disadvantaged to a wealthy champion
of those taking on the medical profession.7 5 Although Michael Koskoff is a bril-
liant lawyer who is able to communicate effectively with juries, Koskoff did not
appear to value establishing a good relationship with the Sabias. Remarkably, as
of October 1993, more than six years after the case had been filed, Michael
Koskoff still "hardly knew" the Sabias.76
To the client-centered or collaborative lawyer, such an admission is almost
inconceivable. Good interviewing is absolutely critical to good lawyering. In
fact, because of the difficulty of overcoming a negative first impression, good
lawyers often try to use the initial client interview to begin the process of building
a solid, trusting attorney-client relationship. Commentators promoting the client-
centered or collaborative approach argue that gathering information about the
client's goals and obtaining a detailed story of the client's problem are essential if
counsel is to properly fashion options that address the client's predicament. 77 It is
74. See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 114-17; Boccaccini et al., supra note 8, at 109; Uphoff,
Tactical Choices, supra note 26, at 802-04.
75. WERTH, supra note 1, at 57-63.
76. Id. at 260.
77. See, e.g., COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 59-61, 87-88, 95-96; Dinerstein, supra note 33, at
547-51.
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equally important, however, that counsel take advantage of any opportunities that
are presented during that first encounter to establish rapport with the client. For
the client-centered or collaborative lawyer, counsel must balance the process of
building good rapport with the task of securing the facts needed to render compe-
tent representation. 7
Admittedly, lawyers may have very limited goals in mind when conducting
some client meetings. Joel Lichtenstein was the lawyer in the Koskoff firm who
screened prospective cases. Thus, when the Sabias first met with Lichtenstein, his
focus was solely on deciding whether the Sabias had a case "that appeared at the
outset winnable, and valuable enough, for the Koskoffs to take on.",79 He spent an
hour with them, was non-commital except to say that the firm would look into the
matter, and was careful not to "inflame" them.80 Although at that point Lichten-
stein was not intent on building any significant rapport, he was interested in being
sufficiently empathetic so that the Sabias would want the Koskoff firm to handle
their case instead of looking for another firm.
Thus, Lichtenstein had developed "a deft sincerity," which Werth approv-
ingly described as combining "an undertaker's solemnity, a psychiatrist's empa-
thy, a banker's perspicuity, a doctor's concern., 81 The book does not indicate
how the Sabias felt about Lichtenstein or his manner. Although they may have
felt comfortable with him, they left his office without feeling as if they knew any-
thing more about their prospects than when they arrived. Indeed, Tony described
leaving their meeting with Lichtenstein feeling "perplexed. ' 82 Lichtenstein cer-
tainly accomplished one of his goals. He definitely had not inflated their hopes or
expectations.83
Once Lichtenstein and Koskoff decided to take the case, Lichtenstein notified
the Sabias by phone. Somewhat surprisingly, Lichtenstein suggested that his
"first job" with the Sabias was "to dampen their hopes that a court case might
change their lives." 84 It is perhaps even more surprising that at this point Koskoff
and Lichtenstein paid so little attention to the formation of their relationship with
the Sabias. No one from the firm met with the Sabias to do a more in-depth inter-
view to learn about their backgrounds, to ensure that the firm had the most com-
plete factual picture possible, to explain the litigation process, or to answer their
questions. Apparently no one was interested in building rapport with the Sabias or
learning about their goals or expectations in bringing this lawsuit.
It is particularly surprising that Karen Koskoff, one of the firm's young asso-
ciates and the person assigned to work up the case for the firm, never did an in-
depth interview with the Sabias. Had she done so, she may have gained an appre-
ciation for how this tragedy was, in fact, affecting their lives. Unfortunately,
Koskoff says it was not until after the Sabias' depositions that she "realized the
78. COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 57-59.
79. WERTH, supra note 1, at 43.
80. Id. at 44. By not inflaming them, Lichtenstein meant, ' work very hard to make sure that they
never leave the office with a great hatred of the medical process." Id.
81. Id. at 43.
82. Id. at 45.
83. Id. at 44 (noting that Lichtenstein was "careful not to inflate their hopes").
84. Id. at 64. Understandably, Lichtenstein did not want the Sabias to develop unrealistic expecta-
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extent of their torment." 85 These depositions, however, were held twenty-nine
months after the Sabias first met with Joel Lichtenstein.
Another consequence of Koskoff's failure to do an in-depth interview was
that she never learned what the Sabias really were looking for out of this lawsuit.
She and the other members of the firm seemingly assumed that the Sabias' sole
motivation was to collect as much money as possible from the defendants. 86 The
Sabias, however, were looking for more than just money. They wanted the defen-
dants not only to acknowledge that they were at fault, but also to formally recog-
nize the suffering they caused the Sabia family. 87 As Werth observed near the end
of the book, for Tony Sabia, "it was the fact that people thought money could
solve his and Donna's and Little Tony's wounds, that it would buy his acquies-
cence, that filled him with such contempt." 88 Nonetheless, it would be years-and
only after serious settlement negotiations had begun-that the Koskoffs actually
began to learn about the Sabias' goals and feelings.
Given the lack of attention that Michael Koskoff paid to rapport building, his
relationship with the Sabias can at best be characterized as superficial. To the
proponents of the client-centered or collaborative approach, Koskoff's lack of
communication and superficial relationship with his clients was potentially disas-
trous. 89 This lack of communication threatened to adversely affect his ability to
effectively represent his client. Moreover, his failure to build a trusting relation-
ship created a significant risk of client dissatisfaction that might have jeopardized
his ability to settle the case. 90
Fortunately for the Koskoffs, one of the firm's lawyers, Chris Bernard, did
develop a good relationship with the Sabias. Unquestionably, the Sabias trusted
Bernard. They trusted him even more than Michael Koskoff, despite the fact that
Koskoff was the firm's superstar.9 1 Bernard gained their trust in part because he
was very competent, but primarily because he spent considerable time with each
of them, and showed them that "he cared., 92 When the Sabias wrestled with the
decision whether to settle, it is questionable that a deal would have been struck
had it not been for the trust between the Sabias and Bernard. Indeed, it is ques-
tionable that the Sabias trusted Michael Koskoff and Joel Lichtenstein enough to
have settled the case were it not for Chris Bernard.
Chris Bernard surely was a compassionate man who was sensitive to his cli-
ents' plight and to their feelings.93 For example, he recognized how traumatic it
85. Id. at 106.
86. The members of the Koskoff firm are hardly alone in making unwarranted assumptions about a
client's goals. See Simon, Ideology, supra note 64, at 53-59 (criticizing lawyers for imparting ends to
their clients without engaging them in a discussion of their actual ends).
87. WERTH, supra note 1, at 311-12, 324-25, 357-61, 365-69. For many plaintiffs, money alone will
not remedy the wrong that they have suffered. Like the Sabias, some of the plaintiffs in A Civil Action
were looking for more than just monetary damages. See JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION, 452-53
(1995). For an excellent discussion of the powerful role that an apology might play in settling civil
lawsuits, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: An Empirical Examination,
102 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
88. WERTH, supra note ], at 324.
89. See supra notes 48-50, 67-72 and accompanying text.
90. See COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 114-17.
91. WERTH, supra note 1, at 357, 366.
92. Id. at 366.
93. Id. at 297-98.
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could be for parents to come to the realization that it was in their financial interest
to argue for an extended life expectancy of their disabled child.94 Nonetheless,
Bernard did not discuss this painful subject with the Sabias or apparently ever
urge them to seek counseling to help them cope with their feelings. Bernard did
spend considerable time, however, talking with Tony so that he did come to rec-
ognize that Tony "wanted more than anything else the vindication of a trial. 95
Werth leaves readers with the impression, however, that Bernard was primarily
focused on enabling Tony to hold it together so that Tony would present himself
as best as possible at trial, rather than helping him heal.96
Werth never related any extended conversations between the Sabias and their
lawyers about their respective goals, the litigation process, or the handling of this
lawsuit. Certainly the Sabias talked to their lawyers, mostly to Chris Bernard,
about certain aspects of their lives and of the case. It was not until just before the
first mediation session, however, that the Sabias got a clear picture from their
lawyers about the case and the potential financial gain involved. 97 Perhaps even
more telling is that it was only during the settlement negotiations that Michael
Koskoff learned about the Sabias' goals, desires, and fears.98 Koskoff's failure up
to this point to explore such subjects with his clients is perplexing. To the client-
centered or collaborative lawyer, such a failure represents bad lawyering. Many
lawyers favoring a traditional approach may well agree with that conclusion. At
the very least, this poor communication contributed to the negative feelings and
sense of dissatisfaction that the Sabias were left with when the case was con-
cluded.99
As the literature on lawyer-client relations illustrates, many variables may af-
fect the formation, development, and nature of the relationship between a lawyer
and a particular client.'00 The lawyer's reputation, status, and standing in a firm;
other professional commitments; counsel's prior professional experiences; the
age, sophistication, and intelligence of both parties; the fee arrangement; and the
type of case all play a part in defining a lawyer's relationship with her client.
Cultural and gender differences between lawyer and client also may influence the
course of their relationship. Additionally, a lawyer's overall workload may sig-
94. Id. at 286.
95. Id. at 298.
96. Id. Arguably, a lawyer is not responsible for helping clients deal with their pain and loss. Many
commentators, however, especially those extolling the virtue of empathy, would agree with me that a
good lawyer would attempt to find ways to help the Sabias' cope with their situation. See, e.g.,
THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
44-54 (1994) (arguing for a moral relationship between lawyer and client like that between friends);
Charles J. Ogletree, Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106
HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1271-75 (1992) (emphasizing the importance of empathy and describing his
friendship with his clients); Majorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in the
Lawyer/Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259 (1999) (discussing the importance of lawyers'
attending to the emotional aspects of the lawyer-client relationship and stressing the value of empathy).
At the very least, Bernard could have recommended some professional counseling. See MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. ("Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself
something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation.").
97. WERTH, supra note 1, at 310. This meeting occurred on Sept. 29, 1993, seven years after the
Sabias first meeting with Joel Litchenstein.
98. Id. at 356-69.
99. Id. at 324, 365-69.
100. See, e.g., COCHRAN ET AL., supra note 7, at 203-21.
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nificantly limit counsel's time and ability to promptly respond to a particular cli-
ent's problems, and thereby undermine counsel's relationship with her client.
Invariably, the personalities of the client and lawyer, their general attitudes and
philosophic outlooks, as well as their overall life experiences will affect the ex-
pectations and attitudes of both parties to a lawyer-client relationship.
It follows, therefore, that a client who has had prior positive or negative ex-
periences with one lawyer is likely to approach a new attomey-client relationship
with a different mind-set than a client who has never previously dealt with a law-
yer. Similarly, a client's prior experiences with the legal system are likely to af-
fect that client's attitudes toward the system and toward the lawyers with whom
the client interacts. Undoubtedly, Humes' prior lawsuit colored her attitude to-
ward the Sabias' lawsuit and adversely affected her relationship with her law-
yers.
°10
Indeed, Humes' relationships with her lawyers varied significantly. Initially,
Humes wanted Arnold Bai to represent her. She was fond of Bai and trusted him
to look out for her interests. 10 2 She received a form letter from her malpractice
insurer, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, however, telling her that
her case had been assigned to the firm of Monstream and May. 10 3 Bob Mon-
stream, the firm's lead partner, was an experienced lawyer who was committed to
providing her a zealous defense.' °4 Nonetheless, Humes did not trust him from
the onset, believing he was primarily serving St. Paul's interests, not hers.1
0 5
It is fairly easy to understand why injured persons who select a particular
lawyer to help them would expect a loyal, empathetic shoulder to lean on and
generally be predisposed to trust that lawyer. A client who is assigned a lawyer
without any say in the selection process, on the other hand, may have very differ-
ent expectations. Justice Brennan eloquently wrote of the difficulties faced by
appointed counsel in the similar context of defending an indigent criminal defen-
dant observing:
It is no secret that indigent clients often mistrust the lawyers appointed to
represent them. There are many reasons for this, some perhaps unavoid-
able even under perfect conditions-differences in education, disposition,
and socio-economic class-and some that should (but may not always)
be zealously avoided. A lawyer and his client do not always have the
same interests. Even with paying clients, a lawyer may have a strong in-
terest in having judges and prosecutors think well of him, and, if he is
working for a flat fee-a common arrangement for criminal defense law-
yers-or if his fees for court appointments are lower than he would re-
101. WERTH, supra note 1, at 46-49.
102. Id. at74, 166.
103. Most liability policies permit the insurance company to select counsel to defend the case, to
supervise counsel's litigation and settlement strategy, and to settle claims within the policy limits at the
company's discretion. See Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities of Insur-
ance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J. 255, 265-66 (1995). When the insured requests a defense, he or
she impliedly consents to representation by counsel the insurer selects. Id. at 282-83. But see ROBERT
H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 114 at 599-620 (1987) (arguing that the insured only
consents to representation by counsel whose loyalties run exclusively to the insured).
104. WERTH, supra note I, at 76.
105. Id. at 75.
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ceive for other work, he has an obvious financial incentive to conclude
cases on the criminal docket swiftly. Good lawyers undoubtedly recog-
nize these temptations and resist them, and they endeavor to convince
their clients that they will. It would be naive, however, to suggest that
they always succeed in either task.
106
Thus, it is particularly important for lawyers who have been assigned or appointed
to a client to maintain a respectful, open attitude with that client in order to over-
come the mistrust that often exists when a client first meets a lawyer he or she did
not choose.
Understandably, Humes was mistrustful of any lawyer selected by her insur-
ance carrier because she wanted someone "to represent her, not her insurer.
' 107
Not only had St. Paul selected a lawyer for her without even consulting her, but to
make matters worse, the company had referred her case to a firm that was located
an hour away from her home. In describing Humes' frustrations and misgivings
about her appointed counsel, Werth masterfully captures the sense of vulnerability
felt by a defendant in Humes' position.1
0 8
To reduce client mistrust and to minimize the resentment that may be directed
toward counsel, appointed defense counsel should afford his or her client an op-
portunity to discuss any concerns about the counsel's loyalty and zeal. A failure
to address and to attempt to allay those concerns is likely to poison the relation-
ship between client and assigned counsel. It is not surprising that a medical pro-
fessional like Humes, who has simply been assigned counsel by an insurance car-
rier, may well have had similar concerns about the loyalty of her lawyer. Yet,
even though Bob Monstream may have been committed to providing Humes zeal-
ous, loyal, representation,'0 9 it is not clear that he or any of Humes' assigned law-
yers were cognizant of, or took any action to alleviate, her concerns.
April Haskell, another partner in the Monstream firm, eventually took over
the defense of the Sabia case. Although Haskell was sympathetic to Humes'
plight, Haskell did little to foster a good relationship with her client. To Humes,
Haskell remained "faceless" and the only communication they had was over the
phone or through letters.' 10 Not surprisingly, Humes had no confidence in Has-
106. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761-62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). For an article discussing
the inherent conflicts of interest confronting an insurance defense lawyer who must try to balance the
interests of the insured and the insurer, see Douglas R. Richmond, Lost in the Eternal Triangle of
Insurance Defense Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 475 (1996).
107. WERTH, supra note 1, at 74.
108. Id. at 75-76. Given the fact that generally an insurance company retains the right to settle claims
within the policy limits without the consent of the insured, insured professionals anxious to fight
malpractice claims because of their reputational interests may find themselves at odds with defense
counsel looking to limit the company's loss. See Richmond, supra note 106, at 509-12. Mistrust
between lawyer and client is not limited, however, to just defendants in malpractice and criminal cases.
For an excellent study of the interactions between divorce lawyers and their clients and the resulting
mistrust that marred many of their relationships, see William L. F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enact-
ments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L.
REv. 1447 (1992).
109. WERTH, supra note l, at 76.
110. Id. at 166.
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kell. She felt "marginalized" and "failed to find any rapport with her defend-
ers."'iI
Unquestionably, a lawyer paid by an insurance company to defend a doctor
accused of malpractice owes a duty of loyalty to that doctor. 1 2 Commentators
and courts disagree, however, as to whether counsel also represents the insurer
and owes a duty of loyalty to the company as well." 3 Unfortunately, there is no
indication in the book that either Bob Monstream or April Haskell ever had a dis-
cussion with Humes about their role, their view of their responsibilities to her, or
their obligations to St. Paul. Had either of them done so, perhaps Humes would
have been more cooperative and, ultimately, more satisfied with their representa-
tion.
Even with a cooperative client, however, the insurance defense lawyer often
finds herself in a difficult position. Defense counsel may feel subtle-and at
times not so subtle-pressure to also look out for the insurance company's inter-
ests. ' 4  Haskell's defense of Humes was complicated because a co-defendant
hospital was also involved. Haskell found herself not only battling the Koskoffs
but worrying that Norwalk Hospital would look to exonerate itself at Humes'
expense. 115
Werth offers us considerable insight into the conflicting relationship between
insurance defense lawyers and their clients-and with the insurance company that
11. Id. at 167.
112. As Silver and Syverud explain, "a debate is raging over the number of clients that defense coun-
sel represents: one (the insured) or two (the company and the insured)." Silver & Syverud, supra note
103, at 273. Regardless of which position one takes regarding this debate, counsel clearly owes a duty
of loyalty to the insured. It is when the interests of the insured and the interests of the insurer diverge
that defense counsel's difficulties become particularly acute. Id. at 340-41 (describing the split of
authorities regarding defense counsel's duties when conflicting interests makes dual representation
impossible).
113. The dual client doctrine, or two client, view holds that the insurance defense counsel represents
both the insurer and the insured and owes a duty of loyalty to each. See Richmond, supra note 106, at
482-83 n.26 (citing cases supporting the duel client doctrine). Compare Stephen L, Pepper, Applying
the Fundamentals of Lawyers' Ethics to Insurance Defense Practice, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 27 (1997-98)
(taking the one client position), with Charles Silver, Does Defense Counsel Represent the Company or
the Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1583 (1994) (taking the dual client view). The Restatement (Third) of
the Law Governing Lawyers takes the position "that whether only the insured or both insured and
insurer (as co-clients) enter into a client-lawyer relationship is a question to be determined on the facts
of the particular case." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 134 cmt. f.
Charles Silver and Kent Syverud argue that the retainer agreement between the insurer and defense
counsel should determine whether counsel has one client or two. Silver & Syverud, supra note 103, at
274-75. There is no indication in Damages that the retainer agreement between the Monstream firm
and St. Paul specified whether the firm represented one or two clients.
114. As Doug Richmond observed, "[fqorced to choose between a good, regular client or the insurer,
the reasoning goes, insurance defense counsel will necessarily side with the insurer." Richmond,
supra note 106, at 483. Or, as Judge Matthes of the Eighth Circuit noted:
Even the most optimistic view of human nature requires us to realize that an attorney employed
by an insurance company will slant his efforts, perhaps unconsciously, in the interests of his real
client-the one who is paying his fee and from whom he hopes to receive future business-the
insurance company.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co., 585 F.2d 932, 938 n.5 (8th Cir. 1978).
115. WERTH, supra note 1, at 85. "Liability was often a zero-sum game: how much Humes and the
hospital would be held accountable, and might have to pay, depended in large part on how effectively
each blamed the other." Id.
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retains them." 16 Although Haskell kept Humes informed about various aspects of
the case, 7 she was not consistent in keeping Humes up to date on case develop-
ments." 8 More troubling, however, was Haskell's failure ever to have a frank
discussion with Humes about her conflicted situation. That is, by asking for the
policy limits, the Koskoffs "had set Humes and St. Paul irrevocably against each
other and that she now was in the middle."'" 9
Haskell's ambivalence about her role reflected her divided loyalties, her un-
certain assessment of Humes' chances, and her mixed feelings about her client. 2 °
Frustrated with Humes' defensive attitude and worried about how Humes would
hold up at trial, Haskell sought to settle, "for Humes' own good."'' Not surpris-
ingly, Humes reacted negatively to Haskell's push to settle.'
Humes' feelings of frustration, resentment, and powerlessness about her
situation and toward Haskell had been mounting. 23 As Haskell pressured Humes
to agree to settle the case, however, the relationship became more contentious. In
describing their deteriorating relationship, Werth observed:
If their relationship could get no worse, it was hard now to see how it
could get any better. Humes was at a dead end: she felt Haskell had
failed her, and even her old friend Dan Clement seemed to think she was
damaged goods. Haskell, for her part, felt saddled with a rogue client.
Uncomfortable with Humes' veracity and unable to count on her coop-
eration, she hoped to settle before the case blew up on her.'
24
The chill in their relationship is, again, hardly surprising. Haskell had been repre-
senting Humes for a year and they still had not had a face-to-face meeting.
2 5
Humes had paid the Bai firm $10,000 to monitor the Monstream firm because
she did not trust her assigned counsel. Her relationship with the Bai firm soured,
however, largely because she felt shunted off to Arnold Bai's associate, Madonna
Sacco. Frequently, the manner in which a partner handles the delegation of case
responsibility to an associate affects the relationship between the client and each
lawyer. An inadequate explanation of that transfer of responsibility may under-
mine the client's confidence in the firm. 26 Perhaps Bai did not do an effective job
116. Id. at 148-49, 156-58, 182-85. For an extended discussion of the conflicts involved in the tri-
parite relationship between insurer, insured, and the insurance defense lawyer, see Richmond, supra
note 106; Silver & Syverud, supra note 103.
117. WERTH, supra note 1, at 164.
118. Id. at 185.
119. Id. at 182. See Richmond, supra note 106, at 504-09 (acknowledging that an offer to settle for
the policy limits creates a conflict between the insured and insurer and puts defense counsel in the
middle). In Richmond's view, counsel in this situation "must make the insured aware that a potential
conflict of interest exists, and advise the insured to consult independent counsel regarding any excess
liability." Id. at 506.
120. WERTH, supra note 1, at 183, 198-99.
121. Id. at 184.
122. Id. at 185.
123. Id. at 166.
124. Id. at 186.
125. Id.
126. Moreover, a younger associate may be unwilling or unable to reply directly to a client's inquiries
but may feel the need, or be required, to run everything by a senior partner. That may cause communi-
cation delays that a client may find increasingly frustrating. Of course, an inexperienced or insensitive
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handing off Humes to Sacco. To Humes, talking with Sacco simply was not the
same as talking with Bai. Consequently, Humes lacked confidence in Sacco's
ability to protect her interests.
Increasingly, Humes felt alienated from those who were supposed to be de-
fending her. Some of her frustration undoubtedly stemmed from Haskell's failure
to listen attentively to Humes' concerns. Although Haskell may be a highly com-
petent lawyer, she was not portrayed in the book as a ood communicator. She
neither appeared to be empathetic nor a careful listener. 27 Admittedly, Humes at
times could be difficult. Sometimes Haskell did strive to listen and to counsel
her. 128 At other times, however, Haskell seemed overly focused on legal aspects
,0129of the case such that she "no longer had time for Humes' feelings, or her own.
Certainly, in some measure, the poor relationship between Haskell and Humes can
be blamed on Haskell's inability to actually hear or appreciate her client's con-
cerns.
Moreover, Haskell's communication problems were not limited to Humes.
Rather, Werth described at length the different versions of the discussion between
Bernard and Haskell about Dr. Kurt Benirschke's opinion. 130 According to Has-
kell, Bernard told her that all of their experts would say that Little Tony was fine
until the labor process and that Humes was liable for his injuries. Haskell inferred
that Bernard, in using the word "all," included Benirschke. Bernard, however,
claimed he was "absolutely sure" he did not represent what Bernirschke would
say.13 ' Bernard's characterization of this conversation supports the conclusion
that Haskell may not have been a good listener.
In contrast to Haskell's inability to effectively communicate with Humes,
Haskell was able to communicate well with St. Paul. 32 Werth described a letter
more than seven pages long that she wrote to St. Paul in glowing terms using
words such as "skillfully" and "compelling."' 33 Perhaps Haskell was more com-
fortable dealing with the representatives of St. Paul than with a defendant doctor.
Perhaps, instead, she simply was better at communicating in writing than orally.
Some lawyers will, in fact, be more adept at using one medium of communication
than others.1
34
lawyer may not recognize a client's growing frustration until it is too late to save a deteriorating rela-
tionship.
127. Many commentators have stressed the important role that empathy plays in gaining a client's
confidence. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 96, at 1271-75. Similarly, numerous commentators have
emphasized the interplay of good listening and successful lawyering. See, e.g., Gay Gellhom, Law and
Language: An Empirically Based Modelfor the Opening Moments of Client Interviews, 4 CLINICAL L.
REV. 321 (1998); Steve Keeva, Beyond the Words: Understanding What Your Client Is Really Saying
Makes for Successful Lawyering, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1999, at 60.
128. WERTH, supra note 1, at 183-84.
129. Id. at 187.
130. Id. at 187-88. Dr. Kurt Benirschke, the Koskoffs' key expert witness, was described by Werth as
"perhaps the world's leading expert on the placentas of twins." Id. at 143.
131. Id. at 188. This misunderstanding was critical because Benirschke, in fact, blamed the hospital,
not Humes, for Little Tony's injuries. Haskell, however, thought Benirschke was "going to tube my
doctor." Id.
132. Id. at 198-201.
133. Id. at 199-200.
134. On the positive side, Haskell did strive to keep Humes informed of case developments by copy-
ing her on all of her correspondence with St. Paul. Id. at 164.
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As with most human relationships, good communication between lawyer and
client is not a one way street. Thus, even if an attorney is ready, willing, and able
to form a good relationship with a new client, the client must be willing to com-
municate if the relationship is indeed going to flourish. In some instances, a cli-
ent's attitudes, expectations, or desires will frustrate the development of a healthy
attorney-client relationship. Damages demonstrates that the Sabias and Humes
bear some of the responsibility for the inadequate of the relationships that they
had with their lawyers.
Good communication and a sound relationship between lawyer and client re-
quire time and effort. Frequently, even well-intentioned lawyers fail to achieve
either goal.135 Damages highlights numerous examples of poor communication
between lawyer and client. Take, for example, Bob Monstream's effort to provide
his client, St. Paul, with his assessment of Tony Sabia. His report described Tony
as "a tall, thin, nervous-looking gentleman ... he does not appear as bright as his
wife, and would make a fair to good witness on his own behalf."'' 36 Yet, Mike
Kaufman of St. Paul formed the impression that Tony Sabia was a "drug addict"
with "an unsavory past.' 13 7 Werth did not attribute blame to either Monstream or
Kaufman for this miscommunication. Nonetheless, their failure to communicate
led to a false impression that unquestionably clouded Kaufman's view of the value
of the Sabias' claim and his assessment of the risk that St. Paul faced.
38
Moreover, some lawyers, even if they are excellent communicators, are never
able to forge a good working relationship with a particular client. Werth por-
trayed Pat Ryan in a very positive light, referring to him as "one of the best med-
mal defense lawyers in Connecticut."' 39 Certainly, Michael Koskoff respected
Ryan as a very worthy adversary. Undoubtedly, Norwalk Hospital trusted Ryan.
He handled most of Norwalk's malpractice cases. Travelers Insurance Company
was involved in the case because, as Norwalk's excess carrier, it was responsible
for any claims beyond $250,000. Yet, despite his superb trial skills and consider-
able charisma, 140 Ryan was never able to gain Travelers' confidence, primarily
because he "had no ongoing relationship with its claim people and little chance of
developing one.' 4' Given the risk of an enormous verdict, Travelers wanted a
lawyer it could trust. 142 Travelers decided, therefore, to replace Ryan with Bill
Doyle.
Like Ryan, Bill Doyle had an excellent reputation. As outside counsel for
Yale University, Doyle was considered by many, including Michael Koskoff, to
be the best corporate litigator in Connecticut. "43 Unlike Ryan, however, Doyle
had what Travelers wanted--"his full attention and the comfort that went with
it-namely the ability to trust Doyle's counsel because Doyle, not an associate,
135. For an insightful look at the problems even well-intentioned lawyers may encounter as a result of
lawyer-client differences, see Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as
Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992).
136. WERTH, supra note 1, at 104.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 84.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 253.
142. Id. at 252-56.
143. Id. at 256.
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was driving the case."' 144 Thus, it was not just Doyle's legal skills, but his warmth
and social adroitness coupled with his ability to deliver that inspired Travelers to
have such confidence in him.
Finally, there was one additional factor that buttressed the relationship be-
tween Doyle and Travelers-Brian Casey. Casey had worked for Doyle before
becoming Travelers' vice president for medical liability. 45 It was Casey who
made the decision to take the case away from Ryan and to offer it to Doyle.' 46 He
did so because he wanted to be sure that everything possible had been done to
limit Travelers' exposure.' 47 In the end, Casey knew he could trust Doyle to tell
him whether Travelers could win at trial or whether they should settle. 1
48
B. Keeping the Client Informed
Most of the time, lawyers who are good interviewers and counselors and who
are empathetic, respectful, and non-judgmental, will be able to overcome barriers
to communication and establish good attomey-client relationships. That is not,
however, the end of the story. A good lawyer-client relationship, like a good
marital relationship, must be nurtured or communication problems are likely to
develop. Just as it gets harder over time for many people to maintain a healthy
marital relationship in the face of hardship and stress, the emotional toll of a
lengthy lawsuit strains even the best attorney-client relationship. For lawyers,
competing demands on their limited time often make it difficult to keep all of their
clients informed of all of the developments-or lack of developments-in their
case. In turn, clients may be frustrated with the slow progress of their case such
that they run out of patience with counsel or lose interest in their case altogether.
Unquestionably, lawyers are obligated to keep their clients reasonably in-
formed about the status of their case. 149 Model Rule 1.4 requires lawyers to ex-
plain matters to the client "to the extent reasonably necessary" so that the client
can make informed decisions about the case.' 50 This duty of communication does
not mandate that counsel promptly advise her client of every action she takes or
report on every minor development in the case. Rather, the adequacy of counsel's
communication depends on whether she provided her client all of the material
information that might reasonably be expected under the circumstances.15'
From the client-centered or collaborative perspective, not all of the lawyers in
Damages kept their clients adequately informed about the case. Werth described
in detail the legal wrangling that went on for months between Bob Monstream and
Karen Koskoff. Despite these months of jockeying, Karen Koskoff later admitted
she did not advance the case in "any meaningful way."'152 Although she may not
have needed to explain to the Sabias in detail why their case had stalled, she
144. Id. Apparently, part of Travelers' frustration with Ryan was his decision to allow his associate,
Beverly Hunt, to depose two of Koskoff's critical experts instead of deposing them himself. Id.
145. Id. at 256.
146. Id. at 253.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 252-53, 256-62.
149. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4.
150. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 20.
151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 20 cmts. b, c, d, e.
152. WERTH, supra note 1, at 83.
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should have at least alerted them to the fact that procedural maneuvering was
bogging down the case. It is unlikely that the Sabias would have been satisfied
had they discovered that she did no work on amending their complaint for a
year.
1 53
Similarly, Bernard contacted many experts looking for those who would help
the Koskoffs find a unified theory of liability that would hold both Humes and
Norwalk Hospital accountable. Werth never recounted any discussions between
the Sabias and any of their lawyers about the selection of experts even though the
Sabias ultimately were financially responsible for the cost of all of these experts.
Moreover, some of the experts with whom the Koskoffs consulted found Humes'
handling of the birth entirely appropriate. 54 Not only were the Sabias entitled to
know such information to enable them to make informed decisions regarding the
risks of going to trial compared with the merits of any settlement, but it also may
have left the Sabias feeling somewhat differently about Humes 155 and about their
claim. 156
Bernard kept the Sabias well informed during his negotiations with Marlene
Smethurst of St. Paul, as he attempted to settle the claim against Humes.'5 7 Once
again, however, Werth does not relate any significant discussions between Ber-
nard and the Sabias about the likely value of their claim against Humes, the risks
associated with continuing to pursue that claim, or the relative benefits of reaching
a settlement. Presumably, Bernard was adhering to Michael Koskoff's philosophy
of limiting the information a client should be provided. According to Werth,
Koskoff "avoided dribbling out information to clients during the long years of a
lawsuit" because "[t]hey suffered enough, he thought, without having to endure
the 'twists and turns and deviations and high and lows' as their cases staggered
through pretrial procedures.' 58 Koskoff had counseled them to "[1]ive your lives
as if you don't have a suit" and he did so in Werth's words, "both to try to spare
them and to dampen their expectations.' 59
Thus, it was not until September 29, 1993, six and a half years after their law-
suit was filed, that Michael Koskoff had a lengthy one hour discussion with his
clients. At this point:
[The Sabias] still knew little about what had happened to their sons and
how the hospital might be at fault. They knew less about the recent de-
velopments affecting Koskoff's thinking-Ryan's departure and re-
placement with Doyle, Judge Ballen's reversals and the trial delays, Lit-
tle Tony's worrisome life expectancy, the soaring value of comparable
cases, the prospects of health-care reform, and the decision to seek me-
diation.
60
153. Id. at 82.
154. Id. at 147, 173, 180-81.
155. Id. at 210-11.
156. Id. at 311-13.
157. Id. at 211.
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Understandably, "Tony and Donna struggled to take it all in as Koskoff walked
them through the case."'
16 1
To the client-centered or collaborative lawyer, Michael Koskoff was expect-
ing far too much of the Sabias. Few clients would have been able to absorb and
effectively process so much information in such a short period of time. Most
clients need more time to reflect on a decision and a lawyer who springs so much
on a client runs a serious risk of overwhelming the client's decision-making ca-
pacity. Consequently, Koskoff's withholding of information until the last minute
undercut the Sabias' ability to make an informed decision about their case. Not
only did Koskoff's approach compromise client autonomy, but it may have in-
creased rather than decreased their overall anxiety. 162 To the client-centered or
collaborative theorist, it is a striking example of bad lawyering.1
63
C. Client Participation in Making Case Decisions
Michael Koskoff's attitude toward and method of keeping his clients in-
formed about their case was a factor that undoubtedly affected his relationship
with his clients. Indeed, a lawyer's view of his or her role and that lawyer's corre-
sponding style or orientation toward interviewing, counseling, and attorney-client
decision-making will invariably shape the kind of relationship counsel has with
his or her clients. 164 Unfortunately, Werth's book does not reveal enough about
the attitudes of the lawyers involved in this case so that the decision-making phi-
losophy or orientation of each lawyer can be definitively determined.
There is little question, however, that Michael Koskoff and the members of
his firm followed the traditional, authoritarian approach to decision-making.
Werth provides us a number of examples of significant decisions regarding the
case-the decision only to sue on behalf of Little Tony but not his stillborn
brother Michael, 165 the selection of experts, 166 the agreement to accede to Doyle's
request for a continuance 67-that were made by Michael Koskoff or one of his
colleagues with little or no consultation with the Sabias. Moreover, Werth never
discussed any conversation between any lawyer in the Koskoff firm and the
Sabias about decision-making authority.' 6 8 At no point does Werth hint at any-
thing that would indicate that the Sabias knowingly and intelligently ceded virtu-
ally total decision-making power to their lawyers.
To the lawyer adhering to the authoritarian model, of course, there is no need
to discuss the allocation of decision-making power because such power clearly
resides with counsel. Lawyers with a traditional lawyer-centered view of deci-
161. Id. at 311.
162. See ROSENTHAL, supra note 30, at 168-69; Dinerstein, supra note 33, at 548-49.
163. See, e.g., Chavkin, supra note 70, at 254 (stressing the importance of involving the client in the
decision-making process as a touchstone of responsible, effective lawyering).
164. See Basten, supra note 28, at 16.
165. WERTH, supra note 1, at 64.
166. Id. at 173-76.
167. Id. at 260-63.
168. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 21 cmt. b ("Ideally, clients
and lawyers will discuss decision-making authority, making allocations that both understand and
approve.").
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sion-making do not value client autonomy highly. Rather, clients control only a
limited set of decisions and have little to no say in strategic decision-making.
Lawyers adhering to an authoritarian approach, therefore, generally would not
allow clients to decide, for example, which witnesses to depose. 169 Indeed, for
most lawyers, such a strategic decision clearly rests with counsel. 7 ° Thus, there is
no indication in the book that Karen Koskoff even explained to the Sabias why
she made the choice to drop Mollie Fortuna, the labor nurse, as a witness.'17 From
her perspective, there was no need to do so. Nonetheless, not all lawyers would
make an important tactical decision, such as the choice not to depose Fortuna,
without discussing that decision with their clients, or perhaps even securing their
consent. 
72
Perhaps even more troubling was Michael Koskoff's decision to agree to a
continuance requested by Bill Doyle when Doyle first entered the case.' 3 Once
again, the Sabias were never consulted about this decision even though they had
been waiting for years to get their lawsuit heard. More significantly, Koskoff
decided to make this concession even though he felt "a trial sooner rather that later
would benefit him and hobble Doyle."'
' 74
Eventually, Koskoff agreed to the continuance, giving Doyle the extra time he
needed to prepare. In explaining Koskoff s decision not to push his advantage,
Werth noted:
And yet he held back. The case was now between him and Doyle, and
the two of them had too much other business together, particularly the
Yale case, for Koskoff to want Doyle to feel that he had taken unfair ad-
vantage. On the other hand, if he accepted a delay, Doyle would owe
him. Whatever he decided, Koskoff knew Doyle would have numerous
occasions to repay him, and would, aggressively, when it suited him. In
the end, Koskoff agreed to an extension, but not before applying his
usual spin. As he would later tell it, Doyle "begged" for a continuance,
and he, Koskoff, munificently and at risk to his clients and himself,
agreed. Largesse was a Koskoff family trait that hadn't been diluted be-
tween Ted's and Michael's generations.
75
169. The comment to Rule 1.2 spells out the traditional ends/means distinction and provides that a
lawyer should assume responsibility for technical and legal tactical issues. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. (2002). For lawyers favoring the authoritarian approach, selecting the witnesses
to be deposed is purely a tactical call that is the lawyer's to make. But see HAZARD & HODES, supra
note 20, at § 5.6 (challenging the ends/means distinction and pointing out that the client should both be
consulted about and, under certain circumstances, able to control tactical decisions).
170. See Uphoff & Wood, Allocation, supra note 26, at 47 (reporting that 88.6% of lawyers surveyed
believed that lawyers should control the decision whether to call a particular witness at trial).
171. WERTH, supra note 1, at 139.
172. This is especially so because Mollie Fortuna, the admitting nurse who failed to alert anyone to
the fact that she could not get a second fetal heartbeat, was potentially a very significant witness. Id.
For an extended discussion of the extent to which counsel should respect the tactical or strategic
wishes of a client, including the decision whether to call a particular witness, see Uphoff, Tactical
Choice, supra note 26.
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Based on Werth's description of this decision, Koskoff appeared to have traded
the Sabias' apparent advantage in order to have Doyle "owe him.'
176
To the client-centered or collaborative lawyer, such an important decision
should be made by the client, not the lawyer. Admittedly, a lawyer need not con-
sult the client or secure the client's consent every time opposing counsel requests
a continuance. This, however, was not an ordinary case, nor merely a routine
extension of time. Rather, Koskoff's "largesse" may have ultimately cost the
Sabias' dearly. 177 Although a full discussion of this thorny issue is beyond the
scope of this article, it is difficult to square Koskoff's behavior with his duty to
zealously act on the Sabias' behalf.
178
Even if lawyers and commentators may disagree about the extent to which
clients should have a role in strategic and tactical decision-making, lawyers are
obligated to inform clients of any settlement offers because the decision to accept
or reject a settlement lies with the client.'79 Certainly, from the client-centered or
collaborative perspective, it was inappropriate for the Koskoffs to reject Beverly
Hunt's request for a settlement meeting without even discussing the matter with
the Sabias.180 Even if the Koskoffs felt that it was premature to discuss settlement
without a better grasp of the case, they should have communicated Hunt's over-
ture to the client with, at the very least, an explanation for why the Koskoffs were
declining this invitation to talk. It is unlikely that the Sabias would have appreci-
ated learning that the Koskoffs rebuffed Hunt's invitation to talk without even
letting them know.
Similarly, when Chris Bernard filed two offers of judgment on March 12 and
13, 1991, neither he nor Michael Koskoff discussed this settlement tool with the
Sabias. More startling is that prior to sending these settlement offers, no member
of the Koskoff firm had even discussed settlement with the Sabias.'5 ' This is
176. Certainly a lawyer cannot attempt to curry favor with opposing counsel by trading the interests
of one client for the prospect of a more favorable result for another client. Doing so runs afoul of Rule
1.7 and 1.2 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-106, DR 7-101(A)(1).
177. As Hazard and Hodes have argued:
[B]oth lawyer and client should maintain a dialog on all but the most technical and mun-
dane of details, and should continually adjust the decision-making process as part of that
dialog. The more a decision marks a critical turning point in the representation, whether
for tactical, strategic, economic, or even political and moral reasons, the more the lawyer
should defer to the client.
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 20, at § 5.6.
178. Admittedly, the relevant provisions of both the Model Code of Professional Responsibility and
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide somewhat conflicting guidance as to the question of
whether Michael Koskoff or the Sabias should have had the final say on Doyle's continuation request.
See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7, EC 7-8, EC 7-9, DR 7-101 (A)(1), D 7-101
(B)(1); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a), 1.3, cmt. For a more detailed analysis of the
failure of both the Model Code and the Model Rules to provide definitive answers on questions of the
proper allocation of decision-making authority, see Dinerstein, supra note 33, at 534-38. No matter
who ultimately had the right to make this decision, there is no justification for Koskoff's failure to
even consult with the Sabias about the decision. Indeed, given Koskoff's overarching duty of loyalty
to the Sabias, it was improper for him to give up his client's advantage and jeopardize their case in
order to gain future leverage with Doyle.
179. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) ("A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision
whether to settle a matter.").
180. WERTH, supra note 1, at 128.
181. Id. at 178.
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particularly remarkable since the case had already been pending for more than
four years. Once again, to the client-centered or collaborative lawyer, it was bad
lawyering for the Koskoffs to have "started the clock on settlement negotiations"
without even discussing the matter of settlement with the Sabias.182
One might expect that a professional like Humes would be more involved in
decision-making than unsophisticated clients such as the Sabias. Unquestionably,
Humes desperately wanted to have a say in her own defense-she even hired her
own attorney. Nonetheless, she was frustrated because her lawyers failed to ac-
tively involve her in the lawsuit filed against her. For instance, April Haskell
never gave Humes a clear picture of her consultations with various experts nor did
she ever seek Humes' input into the selection of experts. 83 Consequently, Humes
never felt that she was an active participant in making critical decisions about her
case because, in fact, she was not.'
84
Neither Haskell nor any of the other lawyers in Damages displayed the client-
centered or collaborative style of lawyering. Rather, the lawyers depicted in
Damages generally followed a traditional, authoritarian approach. Consistent
with this view of lawyering, the lawyers in the book-most prominently, Koskoff
and Haskell-seemed comfortable in manipulating their clients to help those cli-
ents secure what counsel deemed to be best for the client. Although their clients
ostensibly made the decisions to settle, Koskoff and Haskell, in fact, made the
calls.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the end, Damages highlights some important lessons about lawyering.
First, good lawyers do not necessarily adhere to a particular lawyering style.'
8 5
Michael Koskoff, one of Connecticut's premier lawyers, is presented in the book
as a traditional, authoritarian lawyer. Virtually all of his peers, and the lay public
as well, would surely agree that Koskoff is an excellent lawyer. From the client-
centered or collaborative perspective, however, Michael Koskoff's approach to
lawyering runs contrary to the principals critical to good lawyering.' 86 I would
agree. In my view, the authoritarian manner in which Michael Koskoff dealt with
his clients unnecessarily threatened the success of the Sabias' lawsuit, compro-
mised client autonomy, and ultimately exacerbated the Sabias' suffering. None-
theless, Koskoff was able to overcome his failings and obtain a good result for the
182. Id. The comment to Model Rule 1.4 stresses the importance of keeping the client adequately
informed about settlement offers, communications from the other side and general strategy so as to
enable clients to be able to intelligently make a decision about serious settlement offers. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4. For those commentators promoting an even more participatory
role for the client, the Koskoff's lack of communication with the Sabias is even more troubling. See,
e.g., Hurder, supra note 42, at 74-99.
183. WERTH, supra note 1, at 148-49.
184. Id. at 166-67.
185. 1 share Bob Dinerstein's observations that being a client-centered lawyer does not ensure that
counsel will develop a good relationship with her client or that she will handle a client's case compe-
tently. Conversely, an authoritarian lawyer might develop excellent rapport with a client and render
terrific service while at the same time dominating all decision-making. Dinerstein, supra note 33, at
n.248
186. See Chavkin, supra note 70, at 254.
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Sabias. In the end, therefore, even critics of the authoritarian style would con-
cede, as I do, that overall, Koskoff served his clients well.
Damages also demonstrates, however, that even good lawyers make mistakes
and do not always act wisely. As the book reveals, the litigation process involves
a stressful series of judgment calls often made in the face of conflicting pressures
and without adequate information. Inevitably, mistakes happen. Like other pro-
fessionals, good lawyers have bad moments, bad days, and bad cases. One of the
attributes of a good lawyer is the ability to recover adeptly from an error or lapse
in judgment. Nonetheless, sometimes even a good lawyer makes a poor judgment
call that costs a client dearly.
Haskell's failure to depose Dr. Benirschke before settling Humes' case based
on a misunderstanding of Benirschke's position certainly adversely affected her
client. 187 Similarly, Karen Koskoff's failure to depose Mollie Fortuna, the labor
nurse, kept her from learning about Fortuna's potentially helpful testimony.' 88 If
the case had proceeded to trial against the hospital, the decision not to depose
Fortuna might have come back to haunt the Koskoffs. A more critical mistake
was Bill Doyle's decision not to probe further at Dr. Benirschke's deposition.89
Had he done so, Doyle might have discovered that the Koskoffs' star witness be-
lieved his client, Norwalk Hospital, was not at fault. It is unlikely that Doyle
would have settled for as much as he did had he known Benirschke's ultimate
conclusion.
Despite their outstanding reputations, it is debatable, then, that any of the
lawyers in Damages truly displayed the practical wisdom touted by Dean Kron-
man-except perhaps Bill Doyle. Although Doyle stood to have made a lot more
economically if the case went to trial instead of settling, he and Casey settled the
case. Admittedly, he settled for more than he thought the case was worth. 190 He
did so, however, because he had forced Koskoff down $15 million from his initial
settlement figure and he realistically feared a trial verdict of $20 million. Travel-
ers ultimately agreed to the settlement because it trusted Doyle's assessment of the
risk involved of losing at trial. It was Casey's confidence in Doyle's judgment
that led to the final settlement. 91 It is likely that Casey would agree that he and
Travelers reaped the benefits of Doyle's practical wisdom.
On the other hand, Doyle failed to uncover the fact that Dr. Benirschke,
Koskoff s key expert, would have testified that there was nothing the hospital
could have done to have saved the twins.1 92 Indeed, Benirschke called Norwalk's
decision to settle a "gross misjustice.' 93  Thus, in hindsight, Travelers might
question the wisdom of Doyle's judgment. Unlike the readers of this book, how-
ever, trial lawyers like Doyle must make tough judgment calls on imperfect in-
formation without the benefit of hindsight.
187. WERTH, supra note 1, at 187-88, 209-12.
188. Id. at 139.
189. Id. at 308-09.
190. Id. at 365.
191. Id. at 367-70.
192. Id. at 309.
193. Id. at 374.
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Undoubtedly, Koskoff believes he did as well for the Sabias as any lawyer
could have.194 Although he finally recognized during the final settlement negotia-
tions that the Sabias were driven by more than money, Koskoff felt that by push-
ing them to settle, "he had saved them from something much worse: yet another
crushing disappointment followed by the wait for a trial that still might not hap-
pen."' 195 Yet the Sabias' conflicted feelings about the settlement were in part a
product of Koskoff's lawyering style. He kept the Sabias uninformed and unin-
volved throughout the process, overwhelmed them with information, and then
rushed them to a decision without adequate time for reflection.
Believing he knew what was best for his clients, Koskoff manipulated the
Sabias so that when it came time to make a settlement decision they ultimately
would follow his advice. For example, when Koskoff called the Sabias and asked
them to come to his office and discuss the settlement he had already agreed to, he
did not even tell them why he wanted to meet with them. As Tony remarked,
"[T]he only reason I went up is because I thought it was about the trial."' 19 6 Not
surprising, the Sabias were "bewildered. It was all happening too fast."' 9 7
Koskoff's paternalism may well have worked to the Sabias' advantage. Settling
may have been best for the Sabias. That decision, however, was not the product
of "joint deliberations"'' 98 or of the Sabias' "deliberatively wise choice."'' 99
Just as Koskoff failed to exercise practical wisdom, Haskell floundered as she
attempted to represent Humes. Although Pat Ryan concluded that Haskell had
represented Humes "as well as anyone could have under the circumstances, ' '2°°
Haskell herself was not so sure. Rather, she concluded that she was frustrated that
she could not find a way to defend Humes and settled only because it was the best
Haskell could do for her. Despite the fact that she found Humes a very difficult
client, Haskell claimed "in my heart of hearts, I was sympathetic." 20' Given her
frustrations with her lawyers and with her situation, it is inconceivable that Humes
would agree that Haskell treated her as a friend or gave her the benefit of her prac-
tical wisdom.20 2 To Humes, Haskell kept her at arms length, never demonstrating
that she cared or that she was listening to her concerns.
Finally, Damages teaches us that it is important for a lawyer to have a frank
conversation with her prospective client about the nature of the relationship they
are about to form. Indeed, to the client-centered or collaborative lawyer, it is im-
perative that counsel and client have a conversation about the client's expectations
and the lawyer's decision-making orientation before the client decides whether to
retain counsel.20 3 Such a conversation will alert the parties to each other's atti-
tudes and may keep them from entering into a frustrating relationship that will end
badly. Even for the authoritarian lawyer, the benefits of an early conversation
194. Id. at 369.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 365.
197. Id.
198. KRONMAN, supra note 25, at 133.
199. Id. at 129.
200. WERTH, supra note 1, at 209.
201. Id. at 210.
202. Nor would Humes agree that Bob Monstream gave her sympathetic, sage advice. See id. at 164-
68, 183-88.
203. See Hurder, supra note 42, at 88-96.
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about decision-making are substantial. Given the absence of any such conversa-
tions between the lawyers and clients in the Sabia case, it is hardly a surprise that
the lawyer-client relationships, for the most part, faltered. In the end, Damages
shows us that even the most successful lawyers may have considerable room for
improvement in how they relate to their clients.
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